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A REVIEW OF SHIPOWNERS' STATUTORY
DUTY UNDER SECTION 905(b) OF THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBORWORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT: DOES SCINDIA
REQUIRE A CHANGE IN COURSE?
In the wake of the 1972 amendments' to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act2 (LHWCA), many courts and
commentators have wrestled with the problem of defining the standard
of care applicable in negligence actions arising under section 905(b) of
the Act.3 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Scindia Steam
Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos4 defined the standard of care owed to
longshoremen by shipowners and stevedores; however, the Court's
analysis was unclear as to the effect of a shipowner's breach of a duty
imposed by statute or regulation in section 905(b) actions.5 The result
1. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). Section 905(b), enacted in 1972, permits an injured
longshoreman to recover damages "caused by the negligence of a vessel" and provides that the
stevedoring company "shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and
any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." Section 905(b) also provides that the
"liability of the vessel... shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach
thereof at the time the injury occured." Id
3. See generaly G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 449-55 (2d ed. 1975);
George, The Content of the Negligence Action by Longshoremen against Shpowners Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen Isic] and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 11 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 1 (1979); Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-After the
1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAI. L. & COM. 1 (1974); Hazen & Toriello, Longshoremen's Personal
Injury Actions Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1978); Robertson, Negligence Actions by
Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. 447 (1976); Comment, DevelopingA Consistent Theory of
Vessel Liability to Injured Longshoremen Under the LHWCA, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 731 (1979);
Comment, Shipowner's Duties and Apportionment of libility Under The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 323 (1978); Comment, Shipowner
Liability Under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: A
Proposed Standard of Care, 9 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 323 (1980); Note, The InjuredLongshoreman vs.
The Shoowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-Based Standards andAssumption of the Risk,
28 HASTINGS LJ. 771 (1977); Note, Duty Owed by Shipowner Under 1972 Amendments to
Longshoremen's Act is that of Land Based Premises Owner to Business Invitee, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 643 (1975); Comment, The Vessel Owner's Standard of Care Under the 1972 Amendments to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 23 Loy. L. REV. 986 (1977).
4. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
5. Id. at 176-78. See infra text accompanying notes 24-32 & 105-09.
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has been confusion among the lower federal courts.6
In an effort to remedy this confusion, this note reviews the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA7 and discusses the Scindia Court's
interpretation of those amendments in light of the various legislative
schemes that impose statutory duties on vessel owners.8 After
examining the varied approaches of the federal appellate courts in
section 905(b) cases involving statutory violations before Scindia, 9 the
note concludes that Scindia did not modify the law as set forth in those
prior appellate decisions. Any modification would be both unnecessary
and contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the 1972 amendments.10
I. STATUTORY DUTY IN LIGHT OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
TO THE LHWCA
A. The Background of the Amendments.
Prior to the 1972 amendments to the Act,' a plaintiff longshore-
man prevailed as a matter of law in a third-party action against the
vessel owner if the plaintiffs injuries resulted from the ship's unseawor-
thiness (a standard of care similar to strict liability) or the owner's neg-
ligence.' 2 In Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., the first case to
6. For example, in Duty v. East Coast Tender Serv., 660 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane
per curiam), cerL denied, 102 S. Ct. 1442 (1982), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Sc/nd/a requires application of a maritime rather than a land-based negligence standard in
section 905(b) cases, and that under maritime law the violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence per se. 660 F.2d at 947-48. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit extended the Sc/ndla
rationale beyond the bounds contemplated by the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying
notes 114-19.
7. See ihfra text accompanying notes 17-23.
8. See Zyra text accompanying notes 24-35.
9. See hnfra text accompanying notes 36-104.
10. See bft text accompanying notes 105-22.
11. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
12. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Because unseaworthiness approxi-
mates a standard of liability without fault on the part of the vessel owner, it is not surprising that
most judgments against vessel owners were rendered on grounds of unseaworthiness. Very little
case law prior to the enactment of the 1972 amendments addresses the question of a breach of
statutory duty in relation to negligence. Some of the older cases decided on unseaworthinesa
grounds contain dicta concerning the effect of a statutory violation in a negligence-based action.
See, eg., Provenza v. American Export Lines, 324 F.2d 660, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1963), cer. denied,
376 U.S. 952 (1964). However, only a few negligence-based cases based their holdings on statu-
tory violations. These cases, though providing insight into the effect of a statutory violation in
such actions, are of doubtful precedential value because the plaintiff invariably coupled his negli-
gence-based claim with a claim based on unseaworthiness. Thus, in holding that a given statutory
violation did not constitute negligence per se, courts did not preclude the plaintiffs recovery. See,
eg., Copeland V. Oil Transp., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1I, 18-19,20 (S.D. Ala. 1973) (violation of Coast
Guard regulations designed to prevent fires does not constitute negligence per se where plaintiff
injured as a result of asphyxiation; plaintiff allowed recovery on grounds of unseaworthiness). But
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consider the relationship between unseaworthiness and a statutory vio-
lation, 13 a plaintiff longshoreman was struck and injured by I-beams
allegedly lashed in violation of the Safety and HealtliRegulations for
Longshoring. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
"in the area covered by the regulations their violation would render the
ship unseaworthy, and if such unseaworthiness was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury, it would also render the defendant ship-
owner liable."1 4 The court emphasized that the regulation imposed on
the shipowner only the standard of care required under traditional
principles of maritime law: the absolute duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel. 15 The majority of preamendment "unseaworthiness" cases in-
volving statutory violations followed the Provenza decision.16
B. The Amendments.
The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA 7 effected a compromise
see Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964) (violation of Coast Guard regulations
prohibiting the stowage of cotton bales with improper bindings does not constitute negligence per
se; case remanded for new trial).
13. 324 F.2d 660, 662 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
14. 324 F.2d at 665.
15. The regulation casts upon the shipowner no new duty nor does it relieve him of any
pre-existing duty. Now, as before the regulation was promulgated, it is incumbent on
him to supply a seaworthy ship. Now, as before, if the ship becomes unseaworthy
through the act of the stevedore or anyone else, and this condition is the proximate cause
of an injury, the shipowner is liable.... All that the regulation does is to define how
this well-established duty shall be discharged, in particular circumstances .... It
prescribes a standard of safety, not a new duty.
Id at 665-66.
16. See Manning v. M/V "Sea Road", 417 F.2d 603,611 (5th Cir. 1969); Boleski v. American
Export Lines, 385 F.2d 69,72 (4th Cir. 1967); Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d
34,35 (2d Cir. 1965). A few cases, however, held that a violation of the Safety and Health Regula-
tions for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1918 (1981), does not render a vessel unseaworthy per se. In
Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, 229 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. La. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d
422 (5th Cir. 1966), the court stated that "[v]iolation of a safety regulation applicable to a steve-
dore does not render a vessel unseaworthy unless the violation creates a dangerous condition
aboard the vessel, which would constitute a defect in the vessel's hull, gear, stowage and appurte.
nant appliances and equipmenL" 229 F. Supp. at 721;see also Albanese v. N. V. Nederl. Amerik
Stoomv. Maats., 346 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir.), rev'dper curiam, 382 U.S. 283 (1965); Tallmon v.
Toko Kaium K.K. Kobe, 278 F. Supp. 452, 457 (D. Or. 1967).
17. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1970)). Section 905(b) provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negli-
gence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by
reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance
with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the
vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring
services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of
persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel If such person was em-
ployed by the vesseto provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be
permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
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between the interests of longshoremen, stevedores, and shipowners.18
The amendments abolished both the longshoreman's judicialy-created
right to recover on a claim of unseaworthiness in third-party suits
against vessel owners 19 and the stevedore's obligation to indemnify the
shipowner if the latter-were held liable in a third-party action. 20 By
eliminating unseaworthiness as a ground for recovery in third-party
suits, Congress intended to place the injured longshoreman "in the
same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employ-
ment ashore. . . and not to endow him with any special maritime the-
ory of liability or cause of action .... .
The longshoreman plaintiff still may recover if the vessel owner's
actions are the equivalent of land-based negligence. By retaining this
statutory cause of action for negligence, Congress sought to promote
safety in the longshoring industry. Congress did not intend to lessen
the "responsibility [of the vessel owner]. . . where it knows or should
have known about a dangerous condition."22  The authors of the
amendments contemplated that the only difference between section
905(b) negligence actions and land-based negligence actions would be
the adjudication of section 905(b) actions under federal rather than
state law, providing uniform application of the statutory remedy.23
ship building or repair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this subsec-
tion shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the
time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all
other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
33 U.S.C.-§ 905(b) (1976).
18. See general, S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. RP. No. 92-1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprnfedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698.
19. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1946). Although the Sieracki
cause of action is no longer available under section 905(b), it remains available to longshoremen
in'the Canal Zone under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-
8193 (1976 &'Supp. IV 1981). See Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109,1114-18 (5th Cir. 1981);
Pinto v. Vessel "Santa Isabel", 492 F. Supp. 689 (D.C.Z. 1980).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). One purpose of the amendments was to reduce the
number of LHWCA cases in the federal courts by increasing the barriers to recovery in third-party
suits against vessel owners and simultaneously providing injured longshoremen with an adequate
statutory scheme "of compensation. Thus, the amendments also increased the statutory rates of
compensation. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 905,906,908 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-
7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4702-03.
21. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
22. Id Committee reports emphasize that the amendments were not intended to relieve any
person of his duties and obligations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42 & 49 U.S;C.).
23. Finally, the Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy authorized in the
bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the State in
which the port may be located. The Committee intends that legal questions which may
arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined as a matter
of Federal law. In that connection, the Committee intends that the admiralty concept of
comparative negligence, rather than the common law rule as to contributory negli.ence,
shall apply in cases where the injured employee's own negligence may have contributed
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C. The Impact of Scindia.
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos,24 a pallet fell
from a defective winch and injured a longshoreman. The winch was
part of the ship's gear.25 At issue was the shipowner's duty of care
under section 905(b) of the LHWCA. After reviewing the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to the Act, the Supreme Court rejected
the land-based standard of care owed to invitees of landowners, as out-
lined in sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 6
The Court adopted instead the standard applied below by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen work-
ing on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but
only if, the shipowner (a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable
care would discover, the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and (b) the
shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
to protect the longshoremen against the danger.27
The Court modified the Ninth Circuit's standard, ruling that "ab-
sent... positive law or custom to the contrary,' '2 the shipowner may
rely on the stevedore to discover dangerous conditions that develop
during cargo operations, and consequently has no continuing duty to
to causing the injury. Also, the Committee intends that the admiralty rule which pre-
cludes the defense of "assumption of risk" in an action by an injured employee shall also
be applicable.
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CO;NG. & Air.
NEws 4698, 4705.
24. 451 U.S. 156 (1981). See generally Note, The New Negligence Standardfor Shipowners
and Longshoremen--Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 13 Loy. U. Cmi. LJ. 83
(1981).
25. 451 U.S. at 158-59.
26. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TOTS §§ 343, 343A (1965). Section 343 provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land, if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an'unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Section 343A provides:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by
any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless
the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvi-
ous danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be
anticipated.
27. De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1979), aj'd,
451 U.S. 156 (1981).
28. 451 U.S. at 172.
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supervise or inspect the ship after delivering it to the stevedore.2 9 In
- determining the extent of the shipowner's duty of care for the safety of
longshoremen, a "necessary inquiry is whether the pertinent statutes,
regulations, or customs place or assume a continuing duty on the vessel
"30
The Court referred to "pertinent statutes, regulations, or cus-
toms"3 ' but failed to explain the meaning of the word "pertinent." The
problems that may result from this oversight are exemplified by the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Duty v.
East Coast Tender Service, Inc..32 In Duty, a section 905(b) action in-
volving a violation of a Coast Guard licensing regulation by a ship-
owner, the Fourth Circuit expressly relied on Scindia. The court held
that Scindia rejects the application of land-based negligence standards
in section 905(b) actions, and that under maritime law, violation of a
statutory duty is negligence per se. 33
29. Id The Court noted that the standard of care announced by the Ninth Circuit in Scinda
placed too high a duty of care on the vessel owner
We -are of the view that absent contract provision, positive law or custom to the
contrary-none of which has been cited to us in this case-the shipowner has no general
duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover danger-
ous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned
to the stevedore. The necessary consequence is that the shipowner is not liable to the
longshoremen for injuries caused by dangers unknown to the owner and about which he
had no duty to inform himself. This conclusion is plainly consistent with the congres-
sional intent to foreclose the faultless liability of the shipowner based on a theory of
unstaworthiness or nondelegable duty.
id
30. Id. at 176. The OSHA regulations involved in Scindia pertain to the use of a ship's gear
by a stevedore. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1918.51-.53 (1981). Section 1918.51(b) provides that "[amuy com-
ponent of cargo handling gear... which is visibly unsafe shall not be used until made safe." In
addition, section 1918.53(aX5), dealing with cargo winches, provides that "[a]ny defect or mal-
function of winches shall be reported immediately to the officer in charge of the vessel...."
Even in the absence of another statute or regulation placing the obligation to repair a defective
winch on the shipowner, a possible inference from the above provisions is that when a defective
winch is discovered, it should not be repaired by the stevedore but reported to and repaired by the
shipowner. 451 U.S. at 176-78.
31. Id at 176.
32. 660 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1442 (1982).
The facts of this case were unusual. The plaintiff, a carpenter foreman, was employed by the
general contractor for a liquid natural gas (LNG) port facility located on the navigable waters of
Chesapeake Bay. The defendant, East Coast Tender Service, provided access to and from the job
site. 'The plaintiff was at work on the job site when the weather deteriorated, and the defendant
sent the vessel M/V Chandeleur to transport the work crew to land. The commander ofthe M/V
Chandeleur was on vacation, and his replacement, though an experienced seaman, did not have a
Coast Guard operator's license as required under the Coast Guard regulations. See 46 C.F.R.
§g 186.05-.10 (1981). Rough seas made the approach to the loading platform difficult. The vessel
struck the platform, causing a ladder attached to the platform to break loose. The plaintiff was
thrown from the ladder and injured.
33. 660 F.2d at 947-48.
VoL 1983:1531 SHIPO WNERS' DUTY UNDER SECTION 905(b) 1.59
By interpreting Scindia to require the application of maritime
standards in section 905(b) cases, the Duty court effectively circum-
vented the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. In the amendments,
Congress intended to limit shipowners' liability to cases in which the
shipowner was actually negligent . 4 By applying a maritime standard
to find that the violation of the regulation was negligence per se, the
Fourth Circuit effectively returned to a standard of strict liability that
the 1972 amendments were intended to abolish. 5
II. THE ROLE OF STATUTORY DUTY IN SECTION 905(b) CASES
In enacting section 905(b), Congress intended the shipowner's lia-
bility to be predicated on its own negligence according to traditional
principles of land-based tort law. Some decisions prior to Scindia rec-
ognized that violation of a statute or regulation may, in some circum-
stances, constitute negligence per se; however, those decisions are
consistent with accepted principles of land-based tort law.
A. Statutory Duty in the Land-Based Law of Torts.
Under traditional land-based tort law, if a statute or regulation
prescribes a particular standard of conduct, deviation from that stan-
dard may, in some circumstances, be negligence per se.36 Section 286
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests four factors to consider
in determining whether a statute creates an absolute statutory duty to a
particular plaintiff: (1) whether the statute was intended to protect a
class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs; (2) whether the statute
was intended to protect the particular interest invaded; (3) whether the
statute was intended to protect that interest against the kind of harm
that resulted; and (4) whether the statute was intended to protect that
We need say little more except to take note of Scindia Steam Nayigation Co., Lid v.
De Los Santos ... decided subsequent to the panel's decision of the instant case....
In deciding that a shipowner may be liable for negligence when he knows or should have
known of a hidden danger but failed to warn the stevedore of it, the Court lent strong
support to the view that a negligence action under § 905(b) is more properly called "mar-
itime" than "land-based."
... If there was any doubt before Scidia that a negligence action under § 905(b)
might properly be called "maritime," it is erased ....
rd.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
36. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 190 (4th ed. 1971). See generaly Fricke, The Jurid'cal Na-
ture ofthe Action Upon the Statute, 76 LAW Q. REV. 240 (1960); James, Statutory Standards and
Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95 (1951); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
NegligenceActions, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 21 (1949); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HARv. L. REV, 453 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Tort Liability]; Williams, The Effect of
Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MoD. L. REV. 232 (1960).
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interest against the particular hazard from which -the harm resulted.37
If a statute meets all four criteria, the great majority of courts hold that
an unexcused violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se.38 If
all four criteria are not met, courts will either instruct the jury that the
violation is evidence of negligence or exclude evidence of the violation
as irrelevant.39
In contrast, crtain statutes impose an absolute statutory duty, the
breach of which invariably constitutes negligence per se. Although
courts frequently speak of the violation as "negligence per se," 40 such
statutes properly fall under the rubric of strict liability. For example,
the Fedeal Safety Appliance Act41 and the Boiler Inspection Act,42
which regulate the equipment of trains moving in interstate commerce;
have been construed to impose an absolute duty in cases arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),43 and courts have con-
strued United States Coast Guard regulations to impose an absolute
duty in cases arising under the Jones Act. 4 These statutes are limited
exceptions to the general rule that in order for the violation of a statute
to be negligence per se, it must satisfy the elements set forth in the
Restatement.45
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 286 (1965); see also id § 288.
38. See W. PROSSER, supra note 36, at 200-01. A few jurisdictions hold that a violation is
only evidence of negligence.
39. Prosser believes that the former is the better rule. "The arbitrary classification of all
breaches of statute as negligence per se or no negligence at all leaves too little flexibility for the
standard of reasonable care." Id at 202. See also Tort Liability, supra note 36, at 453. Many
courts hae held that when a statute is construed not to cover the plaintiff, or the particular type of
harm, its violation is not even evidence of negligence and can have no effect on liability at all.
Thus, because the prevailing view outside of New Hampshire and Massachusetts is that licensing
statutes are for revenue purposes only, most jurisdictions hold that the violation of a licensing
statute cannot create liability for negligence. Some jurisdictions consider lack of a license com-
pletely imimaterial. These jurisdictions include: Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, Vermont and West Virginia. See Duty v. East Coast Tender Serv., 660 F.2d
93, 943 n.l (4th Cir. 1981) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 102 S. CL 1442 (1982).
40. W. INossER, supra note 36, at 197. See Caiter v. Atlanta & Si. A. B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430,
.434 (1949).
41. 45 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1976).
42. 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1976).
43. 45 U.$.C. §§ 51-60 (1976); see Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430,434 (1949);
O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 390 (1949); Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188
(1949).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438-39
(1958). For examples of other statutes that impose absolute statutory duties, see W. PROSSER,
.rpra note 36, at 197-98. See also ifra note 52.
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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B. Statutory Schemes Affecting Vessel Liability in Section 905(b)
Cases.
Two distinct statutory schemes may impose liability on vessel
owners in section 905(b) cases: Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) regulations,'6 and United States Coast Guard regulations.47
In the older LHWCA cases, particularly those decided prior to enact-
ment of the 1972 amendments, courts referred in general terms to "stat-
utory duty," failing to distinguish these two statutory schemes.
However, the recent trend is to distinguish the two sets of regulations,
their respective purposes, and the duties and rights they create.48
1. Statutory Duties Imposed by Coast Guard Regulations. By the Act
of June 7, 1897,49 Congress authorized the United States Coast Guard
to codify rules governing navigation on inland waters for the purpose
of conforming to prevailing international rules for preventing collisions
at sea.50 The regulations apply explicitly to "every pilot, engineer,
mate, or master of any steam vessel. . .Provided, That nothing..
shall relieve any vessel, owner, or corporation from any liability in-
curred by reason of ... neglect or refusal [to comply with the
regulations]. ' '5'
Although Coast Guard regulations have been interpreted to im-
pose a standard of strict liability in suits for personal injury or wrongful
death brought under the Jones Act,52 courts have been reluctant to ap-
ply these regulations for the benefit of longshoremen in section 905(b)
suits because longshoremen are not generally thought to be among the
intended beneficiaries of the Act of 1897.53 'The legislative history of
46. The regulations for longshoring and related employments are codified at 29 C.F.R.§§ 1915-19 (1981). These sections regulate ship repairing, ship building, shipbreaking, longshor-
ing, and gear certification. See generally Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 612 (1974).
47. 33 C.F.R. §§ 1-199, 46 C.F.R. §§ 1-197 (1981).
48. For a good discussion of the distinction between OSHA regulations and Coast Guard
regulations, see Taylor v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 621 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Na-
tional Marine Serv. v. Gulf Oil Co., 433 F. Supp. 913, 920 (E.D. La. 1977).
49. 30 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
50. H.R. Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1897).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (emphasis added).
52. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The Jones Act entitles a seaman or his representative to recover
for personal injury or death caused by his employer's negligence. In actions brought under the
Act "all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railroad employees shall apply...." Id The Jones Act thus incorpo-
rates the provisions of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). See generally G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 3, at 325-83.
53. See Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964).
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the Act supports this conclusion, as do the regulations themselves.5 4
Moreover, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
has determined that the regulations do not apply to longshoremen."s
Nevertheless, a few courts have held that Coast Guard regulations im-
pose a duty on the vessel owner for the benefit and protection of
longshoremen.
Of these cases, the best known and most often cited is Marshall v.
Isthmian Lines.5 6 The plaintiff in Marshall was injured when an alleg-
edly defective binding on a bale of cotton broke, causing the bale to fal
on him. The plaintiff argued that the shipowner's -iolation of Coast
Guard regulations in accepting and stowing defectively bound cotton
constituted negligence per se.57 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the violation should be presented to the jury as evidence
of negligence, but that it did not constitute negligence per se.58 In re-
jecting the negligence per se approach, the court considered traditional
land-based rules of tort law concerning statutory duty as set forth in
section 286 of the Restatement:
The law is well established that violation of a statute which is
intended to protect the class of persons to which a plaintiff belongs
against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred is
negligence in itself... Inherent in this statement of the legal prin-
ciple are three questions which must bu resolved before liability
could be imposed in this case on a negligence per se theory. What
proof makes out a violation of the regulations? Were the regulations
designed to protect longshoremen? Were they intended to protect
against the risk of the kind of harm that occurred here .... 59
54. See H.R. Doc. No. 42, 55th Cong., Ist Sess: 1 (1897). The Act was not a safety statute; it
was not intended to protect any class of persons from the risk of any particular harm.
55. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., I O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1757, 1758 (1974). The Com-
mission wrote that:
With the arguable exception of one provision relating to the carriage of dangerous sub-
stances the provisions of the Shipping Code as they relate to occupational safety appear
t. apply to seamen as a class to the exclusion of longshoremen as a class. Indeed, were
this not the case there would have been no necessit to amend the Longshoremen's and
Harbor worker's Compensation Act so as to authorze the Secretary of Labor to promul-
gate and enforce safety standards relating to ongshoring operations.
Id (footnotes omitted) (rebutting contention by defendant stevedore that the Coast Guard has
statutory authority to promulgate regulations applicable to the working conditions of longshore-
meny, accord T. Smith & Son, 2 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1177 (1974); see also Marshall v. Isthmian
Lines, 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964). Conversely, OSHA regulations have been held inapplicable
to the working conditions of seamen on vessels operating on the high seas. See, eg., Clary v.
Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 609 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1980).
$6. 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964). Although this case arose prior to the enactment of the 1972
amendmen the plaintiff did not raise a claim of unseaworthiness; the case therefore addressed
solely the plaintifs claim of negligence.
57. Id at 133-34.
58. Id at 136.
59. Id at 134.
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The court held that the shipowner had violated the regulation, and
that the regulation was designed to protect "all persons who work on or
come into relation to the vessel,"60 including longshoremen. However,
the court found that the regulation in question was intended to guard
against the risk of "fire, explosion, and related harms,"61 and not the
kind of harm that befell the plaintiff. The violation of the regulation
therefore was not negligence per se. The court carefully limited its
holding to the facts of the case and the specific regulation involved. It
noted that violations of some Coast Guard regulations, particularly
those related to the transportation of dangerous substances, "may well
give rise toper se consequences." 62 The traditional criteria announced
in Marshall have been applied by courts in other LHWCA cases in-
volving Coast Guard violations,63 and in a few cases involving OSHA
violafions."
2. Statutory Duties Imposed by OSHA Regulations. Congress
amended section 1 of the LHWCA in 195865 to permit the promulga-
tion of regulations applicable to all employers under the Act to pro-
mote safety and reduce the high rate of injury in the longshoring
industry.66 The result was a series of maritime regulations known as
60. Id at 135.
61. Id (footnote omitted).
62. Id at 136. Coast Guard regulations pertaining to the carriage of dangerous substances
are codified at 46 C.F.R. §§ 146-54a (1981).
One example of the kind of exceptional case envisioned by the court in Marshall is In re
Allied Towing Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1976), afdin part and vacated in part on other
grounds sub nom Allied Towing Corp. v. Tatem, 580 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1978). A/ied Towing
involved a shipowner's petition for limitation of liability for the deaths of three ship repairmen.
Evidence disclosed that immediately before a barge exploded it was carrying a grade of fuel with a
flash point range below that for which it was certified under Coast Guard regulations. The court
found the vessel owner negligent for failing to ensure compliance with the regulation. Although
the court in Alled Towing did not apply the Marshall criteria, a careful reading of the facts indi-
cates that these criteria were met: (1) there was an undisputed violation of the regulation in-
volved; (2) the regulation was intended to protect ship repairmen; and (3) the regulation was
intended to protect against the risk of the kind of harm that occurred-in this case, fire and
explosion.
63. See Copeland v. Oil Transp., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Ala. 1973). In Copeland a
longshoreman died as a result of inhaling poisonous gas fumes while removing a manhole cover
from the cofferdam of a vessel in dry dock. The plaintiff alleged that the vessel owner was negli-
gent in failing to test for dangerous gases as required by Coast Guard regulations. The court
found that the regulation was intended to prevent fire or explosion rather than asphyxiation.
Thus, the regulation did not meet the Marshall criteria, and the violation was merely evidence of
negligence.
64. See Infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
65. Pub. L. No. 85-742, 72 Stat. 835 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1952)).
66. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3843, 3844. In 1958 the injury rate in the longshoring industry was approximately
seven times higher than the injury rate in manufacturing activities.
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"'the Bible' for the stevedore industry,"67 which was incorporated into
the body of OSHA regulations pursuant to sections 6 and 8(g) of the
OSHA. 68
Despite various changes in the regulations, the introductory sec-
tions have remained unaltered since their promulgation in 1960 and
bear directly on the applicability of OSHA standards to shipowners.
Section 1918.2 states:
(a) The responsibility for compliance with the regulations of
this part is placed upon 'employers' as defined in § 1918.3(c).
(b) It is not the intent of the regulations of this part to place
additional responsibilities or duties on owners, operators, agents, or
masters of vessels unless such persons are acting as employers, nor is it
the intent of these regulations to relieve such owners, operators,
agents, or masters of vessels from responsibilities or duties now
placed upon them by law, regulation or custom. 69
Although the courts in Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc. 70
and other pre-amendment LHWCA cases7 had stated in dicta that a
breach of the OSHA regulations for longshoring by the stevedore or
shipowner could constitute vessel negligence as well as unseaworthi-
ness, the post-amendment federal appellate decisions have held almost
without exception that a shipowner cannot be held liable for such a
breach by the stevedore.7 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd 3 flatly rejected the plaintiff's
67. Nymphe S.S. Co. v. Atlantic & Gulf Grain Stevedoring Assocs., 383 F.2d 876, 877 (1st
Cir. 1967).
68. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 657 (1976).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1918.2 (1981) (emphasis added). This language indicates that the terms "em-
ployer" and "vessel owner" are not synonymous. Section 1918.3(c) further differentiates between
"employer" and "vessel owner" by defining an employer as one "whose employees are employed,
in whole or in part, in longshoring operations or related employments, as defined herein within
the Federal maritime jurisdiction on the navigable waters of the United States." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1918.3(c) (1981). "The term 'related employments' means any employments performed as an
incident to or in conjunction with longshoring operations including, but not restricted to, securing
cargo, rigging, and employment as a porter, checker, or watchman.". 29 C.F.R. § 1918.3(j) (1981).
70. 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
71. See, eg., Manning v. M/V "Sea Road", 417 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1969); Boleski v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, 385 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967); Price v. S.S. Yaracuy, 378 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1967);
Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. Courts have also held that the stevedore cannot avoid the statutory obligations impo.sed
by OSHA regulations by contracting with the vessel to have the ship's crew perform these duties.
See, eg., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense SA., 474 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aJ'di
part and vacatedinpar4 634 F.2d 30 (1980), cer4 denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Croshaw v. Konin-
klijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or. 1975).
73. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977). In Gay the stevedore had violated 29 C.F.R.
§ 1918.93(aXl)(i) (1981), which requires the employer to measure carbon monoxide levels in
closed compartments within 30 minutes after placement of a forklift in the compartment.
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claim that an OSHA regulation could provide the standard of care for a
negligence action against the vessel: "Gay's argument is, in effect, that
the vessel has a non-delegable duty to provide a longshoreman with a
safe place to work. But this is exactly the type of liability without fault
concept from which Congress sought to free vessels by the passage of
the 1972 Amendments." 74
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently adopted
and extended this rationale to permit the use of OSHA regulations as
evidence to establish whether the shipowner could reasonably antici-
pate that the stevedore would take "special precautions" to ensure the
safety of the longshoremen. In Evans v. Transportation Ma'rtima Mexi-
cana, S.S. "Campeche"75 the court stated that "the stevedore's war-
ranty of workmanlike performance . .. is an implied covenant of
every shipowner/stevedore contract." 76 Thus, the jury should be in-
structed on the contents of applicable OSHA regulations in determin-
ing whether the shipowner reasonably relied on the stevedore's
warranty of workmanlike performance. 77 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Davis v. Parenreederei
M.S. Normannia.78 There the court approved a jury instruction that
placed the sole responsibility for compliance with OSHA regulations
74. 546 F.2d at 1239. Accord Albergo v. Hellenic Lines, Inc., 658 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1981)
(decided after Scindia); Chavis v. Firmlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978); Brown v.
Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Losado v. Cardigan Shipping Co., 1982
A.M.C. 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (decided after Scindia); Garofalo v. Malaysia Overseas Export
Lines, 470 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Or.
1975); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp. Panama, 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Md. 1975), affd,
540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
375 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
75. 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Id at 859. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
The Ryan Court determined that by contractually undertaking to stow cargo in a reasonably safe
manner the stevedore warrants its services to the shipowner. Prior to the enactment of the 1972
amendments the shipowner could bring a claim for indemnification for a breach of this warranty.
77. The Evans court explained:
It is totally unrealistic to assume that a jury can meaningfully assess shipowner an-
ticipation in the stevedoring context without being informed that the stevedore bears theprimary responsibility to correct dangerous conditions and that the shipowner will often
rely on the stevedore to do so .... And in order that the jury have a concrete idea of
what that primary responsibility consists of, the trial court should instruct the jury as to
the contents of the relevant Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring ....
639 F.2d at 860. But cf. Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484,501 (N.D. Cal.
1977), in which the court stated:
[M]aritime regulations adopted under OSHA may be admissible in nonjury trials to ex-
emplify the types of safety responsibilities which one kind of employer in the shipping
industry (Le., a stevedore) owes to its employees.... In the context of a court trial,
admission of the OSHA regulations does not prejudice the arguments of either party.
78. 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981).
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on the plaintiff's employer, the stevedore, and thus used the regulations
as evidence of limitations on the shipowner's duty of care to the
longshoremen.7 9
Despite the vast majority of cases holding that the burden of com-
plying with OSHA regulations rests solely on the stevedore, in a few
isolated cases courts have held the vessel owner liable for a breach of
these regulations. These cases can be divided into two categories: cases
in which the vessel owner has retained control over the operative de-
tails of the longshoring operations, and cases involving a pre-existing
condition of the vessel in breach of regulations.
(a). Cases involving vessel control over operative details of long-
shoring operations. In two recent cases that involved OSHA violations
by stevedores, Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers80 and Lawson v.
United States,"' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that OSHA
regulations may impose a standard of care on the vessel owner. Be-
cause these cases were decided in the wake of that court's decision in
De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. ,82 they seemed to sig-
nify a shift in the Ninth Circuit's approach to defining the standard of
care owed by vessel owners to longshoremen. However, the court's
more recent decision in Davis v. Partenreederel M.S. Normannia8 3 indi-
cates that the court agrees with the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit
Courts's4 interpretation of "reasonable care under the circumstances"
standard, as modified by the Supreme Court in Scindia.85 Yet the Da-
79. Davis involved the positioning of a gangway in violation of OSHA regulations. A jury
returned a verdict in the plaintiffs favor, finding the shipowner 20% negligent, the stevedore 40%
negligent, and the plaintiff 40% negligent. The court of appeals affirmed a denial of the defendant
shipowner's motion for judgment n.o.v., holding that there was sufficient evidence to allow the
jury to conclude that the vessel was 20% negligent. The court noted, however, that it was proper
for the trial court to have instructed the jury that the sole responsibility for compliance with
OSHA regulations in that case rested with the plaintiffs employer, and that "[t]he existence of the
regulation and its reference to the stevedores duty clearly assisted the shipowner's case." Id at
1053.
80. 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 978 (1981) (remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with Scindia).
81. 605 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979), afd, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
83. 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. This was also the position of the Fourth Circuit prior to its decision in Duty. See supra
notes 73-77 and accompanyink text.
85. In Bachtd, a case decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in ScIndia, the Ninth
Circuit upheld a trial court decision to submit relevant OSHA regulations to the jury as evidence
of vessel negligence. 605 F.2d at 446. In Davis, a post-Schtdi decision, the court approved a jury
instruction that the sole responsibility for compliance with OSHA regulations rests with the steve-
dore. 657 F.2d at 1053.
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vis court did not overrule Bachiel or Lawson. These decisions must
therefore be explained by the peculiar facts of each case.
The vessel owner in Bachtel had directed the stevedore in loading
logs on the vessel, using a "method chosen by [the crewmen] and dic-
tated by the vessel's design and equipment."8 6 The deck load of logs,
as constructed under the direction of the vessel owner, was nearly
twenty feet high, and the vessel owner knew that the stevedore could
not rig a safety net as required by OSHA regulations.8 7 The court of
apppeals ruled that the regulations applied to the vessel owner as well
as to the stevedore, and upheld a jury instruction that the vessel own-
er's failure to comply with these regulations was evidence of
negligence.88
The vessel owner in Lawson reserved in its contract with a ship
repair contractor the power to inspect and control the operative details
of the work to be performed. The vessel owner also reserved the right
to forbid dangerous practices that would create an unreasonable risk of
harm to its invitees. The contractor violated OSHA regulations that
required it to provide planked walkways, work platforms, safety ropes,
guardrails, and safety passages on construction sites. The court relied
on its decision in Bachtel, holding the shipowner liable for the contrac-
tor's noncompliance with the regulations.8 9
The results of Bachtel and Lawson are consistent with other sec-
tion 905(b) cases holding the shipowner liable when it had actual
knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition or risk of harm to
longshoremen.90 Because the defendants in Bachtel and Lawson re-
86. 605 F.2d at 443.
87. Id
88. Stressing that the regulations were not intended to relieve owners, operators, or masters
from responsibilities and duties then placed upon them by law or custom, the court concluded that
designing a 20-30 foot deck load of logs without safety nets would have been evidence of negli-
gence under the law as it existed prior to 1972. Id at 445. The court held that OSHA regulations
are binding on the shipowner "where he knew or should have known" of a violation of a regula-
tion by the stevedore. Id. The court applied the analysis used by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964), in determining that the
violation did not constitute negligence per se. See supra text accompanying note 59.
89. 605 F.2d at 453; cf. Ryder v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 551 (D. Mass. 1981) (where
shipowner retained control over operative details of ship repair work and contractor violated
OSHA regulations requiring it to tag and isolate all steam valves prior to working on piping
system, shipowner held concurrently negligent under long-standing custom and practice in the
shipping industry that imposes upon the vessel the duty of isolating, locking or tagging steam
valves).
90. See, ag., Lubrano v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978). The court stated
that:
[i]f the evidence shows only that a ship's officer told the longshoreman to stop working
until the dunnage arrived, thereby fulfilling the ship's duty to the longshoreman, there
would be no case for the jury. But if there is again evidence that a ship's officer, after
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tained control9' over the operative details of the longshoring opera-
tions, they could be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of
an unreasonably dangerous condition or risk of harm. Yet the Ninth
Circuit did not base its holding on a. notice theory, but rather on the
,statutory duty that was imposed on the shipowner by the OSHA
regulations.
Although the rationale in Bachtel and Lawson appears to be con-
trary to existing case law involving OSHA violations by stevedores, the
apparent contradiction may be resolved by examining the role of the
shipowner in these cases vis-a-vis the individual longshoremen. By re-
tamining control over the operative details of the longshoring operations,
the shipowners in Bachiel and Lawson became the de facto employers
of the longshoremen. In section 905(b) cases involving the direct em-
ployment of longshoremen by shipowners,92 the shipowners have been
held to a higher duty of care for the safety of the longshoremen. 93
being notified of the open and obvious danger of insufficient dunnage for a slippery
cargo, had the men keep working or joined in the stevedore's decision to do so, then
there would be a jury question.
Id at 367 (footnote omitted); see also Lieggi v. Maritime Co. of the Phil., "M/V Philippine
Rizal", 667 F.2d 324, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1981) (ship's mate notified of grease spill on topping lift);
Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. Normannia, 657 F.2d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 1981) (evidence that ship's
officer "saw and appreciated" the danger); Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 321 (2d
Cir. 1978) (shipowner knew of dangerous condition and stood silently by while stevedore told
longshoremen to "keep working" and "be careful").
91. The court in Blackburn v. Prudential Lines, 454 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1978), explained
the-concept of "control" as used in the context of § 905(b) actions:
[The "passing of control" to the stevedore alluded to in [§ 905(b)] cases is not conclusive
of the shifting of the responsibility for control, despite the semantic similarity. Rather,
this phrase refers in the shipowner-stevedore context to non-existence of a duty upon the
former to supervise the latter, the shipowner's ability to delegate its duties and the un-
availability of respondeat superior to hold the shipowner liable for the stevedore's em-
ployees.
Id at 1309 n.6. See also Landsem v. Isuzu Motors, 534 F. Supp. 448 (D. Or. 1982), in which the
court wrote:
Plaintiff argues that the shipowner had a duty in regard to the lighting because the lights
were equipment that remained in the active control of the shipowner during cargo opera-
tions.... It may be true that the lights on the ship remained in the control of the
shipowner. But the lighting in that area did not remain in the control of the shipowner.
Id at 451 (emphasis in original).
92. Longshoremen are usually employed by independent stevedoring contractors. Occasion-
ally, however, longshoremen are hired directly by shipowners. Although the LHWCA as origi-
nally enacted provided only for a third-party cause of action against vessel owners, in Reed v. The
Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a longshoreman employed directly by a
shipowner could maintain an action against the vessel under the LHWCA. Congress codified the
holding of Reed in section 905(b) of the LHWCA. See Jupra note 17 for text of § 905(b). See also
Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1976); Griffith
v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 40-44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054
(1976).
93. See, eg., Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, 678 F.2d 424, 428 (2d Cir. 1982); Robertson v.
Jefiboat, Inc., 651 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1981)petltionfor cert.fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3060 (U.S. Nov.
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These cases emphasize that when a shipowner acts as its own stevedore
instead of engaging the services of an independent contractor, it as-
sumes sole responsibility for the safety and welfare of its longshoremen
employees.94 The shipowner qua stevedore is presumed to have actual
knowledge of any unreasonably dangerous condition or risk of harm to
longshoremen,95 and it cannot claim to have relied on the stevedores
warranty of workmanlike performance.96 Moreover, when the ship-
owner acts as its own stevedore, it has a statutory duty to comply with
OSHA regulations because these regulations expressly apply to "em-
ployers" of longshoremen. 97 Thus the shipowner qua stevedore may be
held liable for the violation of a regulation that does not apply to the
shipowner qua shipowner.98
(b). Cases involving apre-existing condition of the vessel in breach
of regulations. At least two courts have held a shipowner liable for
negligence because of a pre-existing condition of the vessel that vio-.
lated an OSHA longshoring regulation. Thus in Julien v. Lykes Broth-
ers Steamshp Co. 99 the shipowner was held liable for failure to provide
safety railings around lightening holes in the saddle of a barge as re-
quired by OSHA regulations. The court distinguished an earlier
case t00 holding that the safety and health regulations apply only to the
17, 1981) (No. 81-935); Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 508
(2d Cir. 1976). Seealso Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, 579 F.2d 682, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978).
94. "Where... there is no independent contractor, it ir part of the ship's duty to exercise
reasonable care to inspect its own workers' workplace, to remove grease spills, etc. In such a case
there is no 'independent contractor' with primary responsibility upon whom the ship may properly
rely." Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, 579 F.2d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly. J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978), quoted in Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, 678 F.2d 424, 428 (2d Cir. 1982)
(emphasis in original).
95. See, eg., Robertson v. Jefiboat, Inc., 651 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1981),petitionfor cert. fled,
51 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Nov. 17, 1981) (No. 81-935). "Because Jeftboat is both owner and employer,
any knowledge chargeable to it as employer must also be attributed to it as owner." 651 F.2d at
436 (emphasis in original).
96. See, ag., Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir.
1976) ("[Al charge which relieves a shipowner of liability for a dangerous condition which was
'known to the stevedore or to any of its employees' is clearly inappropriate where the shipowner,
itself, is the stevedore.").
97. See supra text accompanying note 69.
98. Although no case involving the direct employment of longshoremen has held that OSHA
regulations impose a statutory duty on shipowners, this is a logical extension of the rationale of
the cases discussed above.
99. 1977 A.M.C. 241 (E.D. La. 1976).
100. See Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 375 F. Supp. 233 (ED. Tex. 1974). Hite was the
first case to address the issue of the statutory duty imposed on shipowners by OSHA regulations
after the enactment of the 1972 amendments. The Hite court held that the plaintiff had no negli-
gence claim against the shipowner based on a violation of OSHA regulations by the stevedore.
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plaintiff's employer
As far as the violation of OSHA regulations serving as a basis
for a negligence action, Hite is quite correct. However, the alleged
violation in the instant case was caused directly by the shipowner
who participated in the design of the saddle ...
. .. [While violations of OSHA regulations may not constitute
the basis for a negligence action, they can be indicia of negligent
activity. .... o10
An older and. more famous case involving a similar violation of
OSHA regulations by a shipowner is Arthur v. Flota Mercante Gran
Centro Americana, S.A. 102 The vessel in Arthur was in violation of
OSHA regulations requiring handrails on certain kinds of ladders. The
-Arthur court applied the logic of Marshall v. Isthmian Lines10 3 to hold
the shipowner negligent per se. The court emphasized that it was the
duty of the-shipowner to provide safe access to the ship. °4
Although the rationale of the Arthur court differs from that em-
ployed in Julien, both cases hold that OSHA regulations impose a stat-
utory duty on shipowners. However, the holdings of Arthur and Julien
must be narrowly interpreted. Both cases involve a pre-existing condi-
tion of the vessel over which the vessel owner alone had control, an
OSHA violation "caused directly by the shipowner" that the stevedore
could not reasonably be expected to remedy. These cases thus repre-
sent a well-defined, narrow exception to the general rule that OSHA
regulations do not impose liability on vessel owners.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF Scindia
A. Reconciling Scindia ;vith Existing Section 905(b) Case Law.
The Supreme Court remanded Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De
101. 1977 A.M.C. at 245-46.
102. 487 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973). AlthoughArthur involved a cause of action arising before
the enactment of the 1972 amendments, the case was decided solely on negligence grounds. The
trial court found it unnecessary to consider the charge of unseaworthiness since the defendant had
already been found to be negligent. Id at 562 n.l.
103. 334 F.2d 131 (Sth Cir. 1964). See supra text accompanying note 59.
104. The responsibility for providing safe access was solely that of the shipowner, not the
responsibility of the employees of National Cargo. There is no evidence showing that
National Cargo's employees contributed in any way to the creation of the dangerous
condition. The shipowner did not fulfill its duty to furnish safe access, and it is responsi-
ble for'its own negligence.
487 F.2d at 564. Some courts believeArthur was overruled by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gay
v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977). See, eg., Gallardo v. Westfal-
Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 498-99 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1977). However, Arthur is distin-
guishable from Gay on its facts. Arthur involved the violation by the shipowner of OSHA regula-
tions requiring handrails on certain kinds of ladders, whereas Gay involved the failure of the
stevedore to ascertain carbon monoxide levels during cargo operations. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 73-74.
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Los Santos 0 5 and instructed the trial court to analyze pertinent OSHA
and Coast Guard regulations to determine the'relativeliabilities of the
shipowner and stevedore. The Court- concluded that because OSHA
regulations require the stevedore to report any defective equipment to
the ship's mate and to refrain from using or tampering with the equip-
ment until repaired, a jury might reasonably find that if the shipowner
knew of the defect, he had a duty to intervene and stop the loading
operation until the defect was repaired.1t 6 The Court likewise inti-
mated that Coast Guard gear certification regulations might impose a
continuing duty on the shipowner to maintain and repair its gear and
to inspect the ship's equipment during cargo operations. 07 By imply-
ing that OSHA and Coast Guard regulations may impose a duty of
care on the shipowner, Scindia appears to conflict with the prevailing
view of statutory duty in section 905(b) cases--that sole responsibility
for compliance with OSHA regulations rests with the stevedore'08 and
that violations of Coast Guard regulations are not negligence per se
unless the regulation in question is intended to prevent the risk of a
particular harm to a class of individuals which includes
longshoremen.10 9
A comparison of Scindia and cases that exemplify the prevailing
view demonstrates, however, that no conflict exists. The court in Mar-
shall stated that a vessel owner may be liable for failing to comply with
a Coast Guard regulation if the regulation meets the criteria listed by
the Restatement." 0 The regulation discussed in Scindia required the
periodic inspection and certification of the ship's gear."' Certainly
such a regulation could be found to be for the protection of longshore-
men using the gear in question. The regulation also could be inter-
105. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
106. 451 U.S. at 176-78.
107. Id. at 177 n.25. The Court cited with approval the Second Circuit's decision in Irizarry v.
Compania Maritima Navegacion Netumar, S.A., 1981 A.M.C. 2424 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 969 (1981), involving a vessel violation of the Joint Maritime Safety Code issued by the
New York Shipping Association, the International Longshoremen's Association, and the Port of
New York Joint Safety Committee. The Second Circuit ruled that the safety code, which ex-
pressly applied to "'[the owner, master and officers of the vessel," placed an affirmative statu-
tory duty on the vessel and its crew to "'maintain in safe condition for use all ship's gear,
equipment, tools and work spaces.... used in stevedoring operations."' 1981 A.M.C. at 2425-26
(citing the Joint Maritime Safety Code). See supra text accompanying note 37.
108. Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977). See supra text
accompanying notes 73-74.
109. Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964). See supra text accompanying
notes 56-62.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
111. These Coast Guard regulations were not applicable in Scindia because the vessel M/S
Jalaratna was an Indian ship and therefore not covered by the regulations.
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preted as protecting against the risk of harm or injury resulting from
the gear's malfunction. Thus, the result reached in Scindia satisfies the
land-based negligence per se test outlined in Marshall."2
Firthermore, in limited circumstances OSHA regulations may be
applied against the vessel in a section 905(b) action. The vessel owners
in Arthur and Julien were held liable for pre-existing dangerous condi-
tions on the vessel that violated OSHA regulations." 3 Scindia simi-
larly involved a defective part of the ship's gear, an electrical winch.
The Supreme Court's determination that OSHA regulations imposed
on the shipowner a duty to repair the winch is consistent with the rul-
ings in Julien and Arthur that the shipowner had a duty under OSHA
regulations to turn the vessel over to the stevedore in a safe condition.
In all three cases, the dangerous conditions were under the control of
the vessel owners. Thus the owner had a duty to remedy the dangerous
condition.
Despite this consistency with previous judicial decisions, the
Fourth Circuit in Duty v. East Coast Tender Service, Inc. " 4 interpreted
Sc/nda to require application of maritime law to section 905(b) cases,
and held that the violation of a Coast Guard licensing regulation was
negligence per se. This determination was based primarily on the
Scinda Court's rejection of certain land-based tort law standards as
inapplicable in section 905(b) cases." 5
In actions brought under general maritime law, particularly
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,"6 the Supreme
Court has emphasized the inapplicability of the land-based status dis-
112. See supra text accompanying note 59.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
114. 660 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1442 (1982). See supra
note 32 for a synopsis of the facts of the case.
115. The standards discussed by the Court are embodied in sections 343 and 343A of the
Restatement. See 451 U.S. at 168 n.14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343A (1965).
See =upro note 26 for the text of sections 343 and 343A.
116. 358 U.S. 625 (1959). Kennaree was a suit for negligence brought under the general mari-
time law by a plaintiff who was neither a seaman nor a longshoreman. In determining the stan-
dard of care owed by the shipowner to a visitor on board the vessel, the Kermarec Court rejected
the land-based status distinctions between licensees and invitees as inappropriate in actions
brought under the general maritime law.
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were
inherited from a culture deeply- rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its
'standards to a heritage of feudalism .....
... For the admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinctions
would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality .... The incorporation
of such concepts appears particularly unwarranted when it is remembered that they
originated under a legal system in which status depended almost entirely upon the na-
ture of the individual's estate with respect to real property, a legal system in that respect
entirely alien to the law of the sea.
Id at 629-32 (footnote omitted).
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tinctions embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 343 and
343A. However, the Court's rejection of these same principles in
Scindia was based not on a fundamental incompatability with princi-
ples of maritime law, but on a careful and thorough analysis of the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments." 7 The Scindia opinion
emphasized that "[tihe legislative history does not refer to the Restate-
ment and also states that land-based principles of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence are not to be applied in section 905(b)
cases."" 8 Thus the Scindia Court rejected Sections 343 and 343A of
the Restatement not because they conflict with general principles of
maritime law, but because they conflict with those particular aspects of
maritime law applicable in section 905(b) negligence actions. Further-
more, the Supreme Court's decision in Scindia is consistent with a
trend in land-based tort law toward a uniform standard of care. The
Court noted that "even in land-locked jurisdictions, the trend is toward
the abolition of status distinctions. . . and the adoption of the single
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances."' " 9 The Court's re-
jection of standards based on those distinctions should thus be viewed
as a decision consonant with the development of land-based tort law,
not as a directive to "break land" and return to maritime law.
B. Policy Against Strict Liability in Section 905(b) Cases.
Application of the concept of strict statutory liability to LHWCA
cases is inconsistent not only with the-relevant case law, but also with
the clear intent of Congress in enacting section 905(b) to predicate ves-
sel liability on the shipowner's actual negligence. Such an application
would upset the delicate balance between vessel liability and the steve-
dore's duty of care under section 905(b), and frustrate the compromise
effected by Congress in enacting the 1972 amendments to the
117. 451 U.S. at 164-72.
118. Id. at 168 n.14; accord Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1135 (1981).
Since a rigid application of sections 343 and 343A is generally niore favorable to the
vessel than the previous maritime negligence rule because of the presence of status dis-
tinctions and connotations of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, those
sections should not be made the basis of the standard of care without an explicit indica-
tion that Congress so intended.
613 F.2d at 349.
119. 613 F.2d at 349 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d
561,70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537,489 P.2d 308 (1971)
(en banc); Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116
N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564
(1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
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LHWCA. °20 The section 905(b) denial of the shipowners' right to in-
demnity from stevedores was balanced by limiting the shipowners' lia-
bility for negligence. Because the courts have strictly interpreted
section 905(b) in refusing shipowners indemnity from partially negli-
gent stevedores, 12' fairness requires that the courts be equally strict in
requiring that vessels be liable only for their own negligence.
It is therefore important that the vessel's negligence be determined
according to traditional concepts of land-based tort law, not strict lia-
bility. To base vessel liability on a form of absolute statutory duty-
whether derived from OSHA regulations, Coast Guard regulations, or
both-would cause shipowners to be legally negligent in a much
greater percentage of cases, and require the shipowner to pay for the
stevedore's fault as well as its own. Because OSHA and Coast Guard
regulations are multitudinous, a violation would probably be found in
a large percentage of personal injury cases. Finally, because the plain-
tiffwould have an increased likelihood of recovery under a standard of
strict statutory liability, the number of section 905(b) cases would in-
crease--an 'effect that the 1972 amendments were intended to
alleviate.12
IV. CONCLUSION
In cases decided subsequent to the enactment of the 1972 amend-
ments to the LHWCA, courts have shown a reluctance to hold a ship-
owner -negligent on the basis of a breach of statutory duty.
Nonetheless, a few have held the shipowner negligent because of its
120. See Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, 579 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cer.
dented, 439 U.S. 929 (1978); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1246-48 (3d Cir.), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505,
506-07 (2d Cir. 1976); Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1975); Ramirez v.
Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 650-52 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts
Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (specially convened three-judge panel), appeal ds.
m ised, No. 75-1223 (3d Cir., April 30, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
121. This is particularly true in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979). In Edmonds, a section 905(b) case,
the jury deterniined that the plaintiff was 10% at fault, the stevedore 70% at fault, and the ship-
owner 20% at fault. The trial court reduced the plaintiff's award by the 10% attributed to his own
negligence but refused further to reduce the award against the shipowner in proportion to the fault
of the stevedore. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court, holding that the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA prohibit the application of a proportionate-fault rule in section
905(b) cases. See also Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. Normannia, 657 F.2d 1048 (91h Cir. 1981);
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978)f Samuels v. Empresa Linas Maritimas
Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978), cer. dented, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); Dodge v. Mitsui
Shintaku Ginko K. K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976);
Sheliman v. United States Lines. 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied. 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
122 See supra note 20.
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violation of a Coast Guard or an OSHA regulation. In those cases the
courts carefully adhered to the principles of land-based tort law found
in Sections 286 and 288 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and syn-
thesized by the Fifth Circuit in Marshall.2 3
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Scindia does not modify
this existing body of case law. In Scindia the Court placed definite
limits on the duty of the shipowner, applying a standard of care based
not on maritime standards but rather on the land-based concept of rea-
sonable care under the circumstances.' 24 Thus, Scindia should not be
construed to require the application of maritime concepts of strict stat-
utory liability in section 905(b) cases involving violations of OSHA or
Coast Guard regulations. Decisions adopting such a standard are con-
trary to the intent and purpose of section 905(b).
Kaye A. J6ser
123. See supra text accompanying note 59.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 105-19.
